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ABSTRACT
The U.S. counter terrorism on ISIS had implemented with various strategies in-
cluding degrading ISIS’s capability, shaping global coalition to defeat ISIS, and
using trained military armed men for Iraq army forces, Kurdi army, Arabian army,
and moderate opposition groups to fight against Bassar. In early 2015, U.S.
government described the group as “losing this fight” and reported that anti-
ISIS operations had killed more than 8,500 fighters, destroyed hundreds of ve-
hicles and heavy weapons systems, and significantly degraded IS command and
control capabilities. Unfortunately, ISIS still exists with their weapons. Moreover,
the fear against ISIS and the worst conditions it brings are not exclusive in Syria,
Iraq and Libya as the conflict has already spread to many countries in Europe.
These countries are in dilemma because despite being affected by the conflict,
still they intend to give asylum to the refugees, but their concern is that with
refugees coming in, there might be exporting of ISIS’s ideologies which leads to
bigger and more serious concerns than the possibility of economic instability.
Inevitably, there have been questions regarding the existence of ISIS today: How
can groups such as ISIS still exists despite being attacked for 3 years by the U.S?
The reality is that the U.S. initiated the establishment of new and democratic
governments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya few years ago bothers some experts
on the continuing existence of ISIS.
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INTRODUCTION
This article describes how U.S. “defeats” terrorism.
When ISIS first appeared, the U.S released its counterter-
rorism policy to defeat it. This discussion includes back-
ground of the problem, theoretical framework, methodol-
ogy, findings, discussion, conclusion, and implication.   The
obvious challenges in the 21th century are the war against
terrorism, globalization and failed states. The first chal-
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lenge is the hottest issue next to the two others because of the
sudden impacts to the welfare of human being.
Terrorism is the concern of all countries this century and they
are taking various actions against it. Such actions are not only
implied in among foreign policies but also in the internal state
policies. The United States of America (USA) leads the cam-
paign against terrorism as it has been very active with its
counterterrorism policy.
Now in an interdependent world, the United States can no
longer keep global problems such as terrorism at a distance be-
cause of terrorists’ organizations had large members and spread-
ing operations in many areas (Goldstein, 2007:202). Thus, their
strategy was to spread democratic ideas.
This is validated with the democratic wave in the Arabian
countries. After the Iraqi revolution and the decline of Saddam
Hussein in 2003; there was a people power of Tunis which pulled
down Ben Ali from his leadership in 2011; and in Libya,
Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed in October 20 2011,
and in Egypt, Mursi ended his presidency in 2012. With this
turbulence in the Arab’s political conditions, Syria was then tar-
geted.
President Bassar Assad, the Syrian dictator is known for its
brutality. On March 2013, the United Nations (UN) reported
that there were seventy thousand (70,000) Syrians died in the
uprising against the dictator. There were almost half a million
Syrians who left their lands, and up to two hundred and fifty
thousand were refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and in Eu-
ropean countries. The economy of Syria was shattered, with in-
flation soaring and exports collapsing (Jackson, 2013:321).
There are various Islamic movements who want to implement
Islamic sharia. There are famous name known as Islamic move-
ments or groups such as Hamas, Moslem Brotherhood, Taliban,
Jamat Tabligh, Jama’at Islami, Hizbut Tahrir, Al Qaida and Jabhah
Al Nusra. They sounded da’wa and Islamic Jihad for it (Baylis,
2001:464). In Syria, one organic strong group which is not only
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a movement but an Islamic State called Khilafah (Caliphate) came
to power in 2014.
In the summer of 2014 there was a resounding success for
ISIS.  Their movement already expanded, not only in Iraq and
Syria, but also in Libya as of 2015. In the spirit of Islamic jihad
guiding their thoughts and actions, many cities fell to their forces.
In March 2015, the Iraqi forces started their intense counter-
attack until ISIS (Dais) was seized in May 2015 (Ramadi Welby,
2015:1).
The ISIS or Dais is a transnational Sunni Islamist flow and
has expanded its control over areas of northwestern Iraq, Syria
and now Libya. The Islamic State has Sunni dominated. The
existence of ISIS or Dais actually created deep conflict in many
countries which support Bassar or the oppositions (Blanchard,
2015:1).
This group triggered questions among many experts: Is ISIS
an originally Moslem group who want to implement their ideol-
ogy purely? Is it made by U.S and Allies, or made by Israel? Is this
supported by Arabian Leaders? The evidences found were un-
clear but offered four arguments.
The first view, the Islamic State was a true khilafah (Manjanik,
2015:1). While second view is about the desire of the US to topple
Syrian President Bashar Assad that it channeled arms and funds
to the Syrian rebels, and many of whom splintered off and formed
the Dais, which is now giving the US far more problems than it
had bargained for (Manjanik, 2015:3). Moreover, the third view
is that ISIS was made by Israel and its allies (Weber, 2014:3).
There is a site called Veterans Today apparently started a rumor
that ISIS leader Baghdadi is a Mossad agent who want to estab-
lish the Israel imperium (Weber, 2014:3).  The forth view, that
ISIS was made by Arabian Leader to bring down Bashar Assad
(Weber, 2014:2).
All views from their side were logical; however, there is a need
to consider which of those views were true or false. The current
situations suggest that everything could happen; all actors came
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from inside or outside region. These situations showed that World
War III may nearly happen.
The logical argument for the first view is that ISIS is an Is-
lamic group attempting Islamic Law in factual khilafah as their
known and belief. They implement their belief concerning the
war situations. The argument for the second view is that ISIS
can be made by United States as a measure to defeat Bashar
Assad but cover Iraq government because Bassar’s dictatorship
and his regime was controlled by Russia, China, and Iran. The
argument for the third view is that ISIS is created by Israel and
its allies to divert the issue of Israel-Palestine conflict and the
other hand to worsen the image of Islam with their ruthlessness.
And the fourth argument is that ISIS is supported by Arabian
leader since Bashar Assad is a Shiite leader minority in Sunni
Arabian majority. Also because of Assad has tight relations with
Iran and their Shiite communities.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Counterterrorism was started from United States after one
of its vital properties have been attacked on 9/11. The world
witnessed the fall of World Trade Center in New York and Pen-
tagon in Washington D.C. The terrorist attack brought horror
to the public with its more than 2000 victims. Consequently,
the United States has launched foreign policy for countering ter-
rorism almost in all states and today, the US has large alliances
on their security campaign.
Counterterrorism is important measure in the foreign policy
of U.S. Modelski told that foreign policy is the effort of states to
change the behavior of other states and for implementing their
own interests in the international system (Kegley, 2006:58). He
also mentioned that foreign policy is the authority measures to
realize their international objectives (Kegley, 2006:58).
According to Jackson, that counterterrorism is trying to inter-
rupt or demolish terrorists with using of special forces – drones
also used as new measure in this measure (Jackson, 2013:307).
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Counterterrorism as Jackson explained, need some measures:
strong regional and large partnerships in intelligence and law
enforcement agreement, cooperating with states where terrorist
can organize their supporters, block terrorists funding and its
supporters with international cooperation, rewards for provid-
ing the information related terrorism activity, emphasizing
counter radicalization as a main activity, long-term set up pro-
grams under the U.S. Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA)
to provide partnership in training, equipment and technology
to find and arrest terrorists with other countries (Jackson,
2013:356).
United States dealt with many agendas and measures of
counterterrorism in many countries and in various forums but it
resulted to more violence. After Afghanistan, Iraq, Tunis, Libya,
and Egypt, now Syiria became the hottest arena. Many move-
ments came from that region, such as Taliban, Al Qaeda, Jabhah
Al Nusra, Hezbollah, Al Sahab, Mahdi Army, and ISIS as the
greatest contemporary movement. ISIS was the new one and it
included in the terrorist list of West.
U.S government, as Mc Cants pointed out, proclaimed that
they defeated the ISIS and maintains the peace of region. Obama
said on November 5, 2014, that the United States will isolate
and reduce the areas of the Islamic State operation in Syria and
support of the U.S. priority of rolling Iraq government. On Sep-
tember 2014, U.S. officials warned the Syrian government to strike
Syrian territory, without any coordination with the regime of
Bashar. He emphasized that now, people are standing against
terrorism (Mc Cant, 2015:1).
He also cited the U.S. Department of State declaration on
September 10, 2014, where President Obama announced the
broader international coalition to defeat ISIS (Dais). He pro-
claimed that U.S. will defeat and ultimately destroy ISIS with a
comprehensive and systematic strategy in operating
counterterrorism” (U.S. Department of State, 2015:1).
He showed for now there is a coalition with 65 states in one
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commitment to eliminate ISIS terror. This coalition demonstrates
the global support and show the similar goal of destroying terror-
ism and peace building (U.S. Department of State, 2015:1).
Conceptually, U.S. counterterrorism was very obvious and
ambitious to defeat ISIS, and this strategy intends to maintain
the region in peace. If the U.S. counterterrorism will be sustained,
then the ISIS will be defeated and the region will be peaceful.
RESEARCH METHOD
This research was explained the impacts of U.S
Counterterrorism implementation as independent variable to
the ISIS existence and peace of that region (Iraq, Syria and Libya)
as dependent variables with deductive approach. This is a quali-
tative research which utilizes case studies to analyze the strategies
of the U.S counterterrorism policy to defeat ISIS and the im-
pacts of these strategies to the region.
ROAD MAP OF RESEARCH
     FIGURE 1. ROAD MAP OF RESEARCH
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FINDINGS
The focus of this study is still new and a hot issue because of
the emergence of ISIS and the U.S. counterterrorism is still on-
going. This topic is rarely found specially as a master project in
international relations affair. So this study will be one of the new
issues in this topic and can be a basis for next research and also
for who concern about this issue.
The purposes of study were found of academic and practical
purpose.
a. In academic purpose, this research could be expected to gain
answers related to: first, the U.S. counterterrorism policy in
defeating ISIS and second, the impacts of the U.S.
counterterrorism policy implementation to ISIS and the re-
gion partly Syria, Iraq and Libya. Hoping the research will
enrich theory or at least to enrich contemporary view in inter-
national relations.
b. In practical purpose, this research is expected to be one of
reference for international affairs offices or to whoever is in-
terested with global perspective.
United States, after the fall of Soviet Union, is a great politi-
cal and economic state. The U.S. views the world in the neo
realist perspective that threat is never ending in life. Even Soviet
Union has collapsed but it evolved in other form of Soviet threat
because both states still is competing as a great power. On the
other hand, the new threat is raised from other kind of enemies.
If the Presidency of W. Bush emphasized the “war on terror-
ism” because it is not “law enforcement,” it is also in the same
way with Obama. As shortly after Obama came into office, it is
no longer ‘”terrorism,” it is “man-made disaster,” or “work place
violence;” and there is no more “Islamic extremism” because it
is not politically correct. We must identify our enemy. The en-
emy is not Islam; it is not all Muslims (Zaideman, 2015:3).
In this respect, since 2005, there is a seven-stage strategy to
victory that has subsequently been only modestly adjusted and
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adapted to both unforeseen and emerging global developments.
This strategy entails the following phases:
• The Awakening Stage (2000–2003), which coincided with the
11 September 2001 attacks, and is described in Al Qaeda pro-
paganda as “Reawakening the nation by dealing a powerful
blow to the head of the snake in the U.S.”
• The Eye-Opening Stage (2003–2006), which unfolded after
the U.S. invasion of Iraq and was allegedly designed to per-
petually engage and enervate the United States and the West
in a series of prolonged overseas ventures.
• The Rising Up and Standing on the Feet Stage (2007–2010)
involved Al Qaeda’s proactive expansion to new venues of
operations, as we have seen in West Africa and the Levant.
• The Expansion Stage (2010–2013), which continued after bin
Laden’s killing and sought to exploit the new opportunities
created by the “Arab Spring” to topple apostate regimes, espe-
cially in Syria.
• The Declaration of the Caliphate Stage (2013–2016) when Al
Qaeda will achieve its ultimate goal of establishing trans- or
supra-national Islamic rule over large swaths of territory in
the Muslim world. ISIS has clearly stolen a march on them in
this respect.
• The Total Confrontation Stage (2016–2020) will occur after
the Caliphate has created an Islamic Army and commences
the ûnal “ûght between the believers and the nonbelievers.”
• The ûnal, Deûnitive Victory State (2020–2022), when the
Caliphate will ultimately triumph over the rest of the world
(Zaideman, 2015:2).
The story of the ISIS is intimately linked to the American
occupation of Iraq and the civil war in Syria. Iraq laid down the
initial conditions: heightened sectarianism caused by inadequate
appreciation of the need to engage in social balancing to prevent
grievances, the use of violent tactics to project power, and the
ability to attract a ûood of foreign ûghters. The Syrian civil war
helped shape ISIS’s tactics (seizing territory, controlling smug-
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gling routes, and working with local actors), but more impor-
tantly it linked the conûict in Iraq, where Sunnis clashed with
the Maliki regime, and in Syria, there are majority of Sunni fight-
ing minority of Siite of Bashar regime (Kfir, 2015:237-238).
There are many civilians army that occupied each lands and
territory. The presence of ISIS and its occupied territory and
civilian army are shown in figure 2 below.
FIGURE 2. ISIS CONTROLLED CITIES:
Source:http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=Syria+Isis+Map+September+2015&FORM=IDMHDL.
The US Central Intelligence Agency believes IS may have up
to 31,000 fighters in the region, many of whom are foreign re-
cruits. The figures from the London-based International Centre
for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) and
the New York-based Soufan Group show an estimated 20,000
fighters from almost 80 countries have travelled to Syria and Iraq
to fight with extremist groups. The figures suggest that while
about a quarter of the foreign fighters are from the West, the
majority are from nearby Arab countries, such as Tunisia, Saudi
Arabia and Jordan and Morocco (Battle for Iraq and Syria in
maps, January 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
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The origins of ISIS are mired in controversy and dispute, but
it appears to be a product of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which
was established in 2006 by several Iraqi Al Qaeda– based or
afûliated groups such as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Mujahedeen
Shura Council in Iraq, and Jund al-Sahhaba (Soldiers of the
Prophet’s Companions) (Battle for Iraq and Syria in maps, Janu-
ary 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
27838034:240).
However, fanciful ISIS’s caliphate and embryonic Islamist
Empire may seem, it is equally undeniable that ISIS is now sover-
eign over a territorial expanse stretching from Aleppo in Syria to
the suburbs of Baghdad. In this respect, history has often shown
how splits within terrorist movements have led to increased lev-
els of violence and greater blood shed as factions compete with
one another for prestige, support, and viability (Hoffman,
2015:81-82).
U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM ON ISIS
U.S. strengthened the counterterrorism strategy after being
cheated on the 9/11 attacks. There are two contrasting public
policy approaches to terrorism: a military response and a more
moderate approach based on a combination of diplomacy, aid,
intelligence, and law enforcement. The comprehensive approach
to terrorism was accompanied by a U.S. switch from the estab-
lished foreign policy strategy of containment and deterrence to a
preventive strike strategy. This new, preventive counterterrorism
policy found its first expression in the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Jack-
son, 2013:329-332).
Counterterrorism need some measures such as following: re-
gional strength and large partnerships in intelligence and law
enforcement, cooperating with states where terrorist can orga-
nize their supporters, block terrorists funding and its support-
ers, rewards for providing the information related terrorism,
emphasizing counter radicalization as a main activity, long-term
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set up programs under the U.S. Antiterrorism Assistance Pro-
gram (ATA) to provide partnership in training, equipment and
technology to demolish terrorists (Jackson, 2013:356).
The Bush and Obama broadly interpreted the scope of per-
missible action in dealing with terrorism. In short, the executive
has retained broad latitude, particularly in terms of deûning what
constitutes “necessary” military action (McIntosh, 2015:25-26).
As a response to the existence of ISIS, U.S. strategies includ-
ing degrade the capability of ISIS, made multilateral coalition,
and using military forces. On September 10, 2014, President
Obama announced a series of actions intended to “degrade, and
ultimately destroy” the Islamic State organization. (McIntosh,
2015:23). Their strategies are the following:
First, the response of the United States to 9/11 as mentioned
by Jackson included both – President George W. Bush declared
a “war on terror,” also set up a New Homeland Security to be
responsible for domestic security as a new governmental depart-
ment, and initiated other less aggressive approaches. Then Bush
modified his approaches in larger field from a “war on terror”
game to a “global struggle against violent extremism” (Jackson,
2013:329).
Second, U.S. government has an agreement to use military
forces as the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF).
Then as part of the strategy, in June 2015, approximately 3,100
U.S. military personnel and 450 special military trainers have
deployed to the Iraq Theater of operations to advise and train
Iraqi forces, gather intelligence on the Islamic State, and secure
U.S. personnel and facilities. Coalition partners also have pledged
and begun deploying about 1,500 advisers and trainers for the
ISF. U.S. and coalition personnel are implementing joint Iraqi-
coalition plans for the training of 12 Iraqi brigades (9 Iraqi Secu-
rity Force [ISF] brigades and 3 Kurdish peshmerga brigades—a
total of about 25,000 personnel) (The Global Coalition to
Counter ISIL U.S. Department of State., Http://www.state.gov/
s/seci/, 2015:16-17).
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As the sub strategies of military forces, U.S. used the “Train
and Equip” Assistance programme which included Iraqi Secu-
rity Forces, Foreign Military Sales and Arms Transfers, Iraqi
Kurdish and Sunni Arab Forces, Support for Kurdish Forces,
and U.S. Training and Equipment for Vetted Syrians.
Third, on the same day, Obama announced the formation of
a broad global coalition to defeat the ISIS soon with 65 mem-
bers states. The coalition had run The Five Lines of Effort in-
clude providing military support to our partners, impeding the
flow of foreign fighters, stopping ISIL’s financing and funding.
U.S. and coalition forces have used combat aircraft, armed un-
manned aerial vehicles, and sea launched cruise missiles to con-
duct more than 3,700 strikes in Iraq since August 8, 2014, and
in Syria since September 22, 2014. Now it is supporting defen-
sive and offensive military operations by Iraqi military and
Kurdish forces and weakening the Islamic State organization’s
ability to support its operations in Iraq from its bases inside Syria
(The Global Coalition to Counter ISIL U.S. Department of
State., Http://www.state.gov/s/seci/, 2015:15).
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM
The implementation of U.S. strategies to defeat ISIS as men-
tioned above consist of eradicating and degrading the power and
ability of ISIS, build the global coalition, and military forces at-
tack. In its strategies, the effective implementation was questioned
because of the ISIS continued existence and operations in the
ground of government and battle. The succeeding paragraphs
will discuss the details of implementation and strategies.
The implementation of a New Homeland Security. U.S.
strengthened homeland security with a new governmental de-
partment, and initiated other less aggressive approaches. Obama
activate the personnel officially to implement the strategies. Re-
tired General John Allen serves as Special Presidential Envoy for
the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and Brett McGurk, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (Iraq and
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Iran), serves as General Allen’s deputy senior envoy with the
rank of Ambassador. U.S. military operations as part of the anti-
IS strategy have been termed “Operation Inherent Resolve.” U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Lloyd
Austin is the lead U.S. officer in the military operations against
the Islamic State and other extremists in Iraq and Syria. Daniel
Rubenstein serves as U.S. Special Envoy for Syria. Ambassador
Thomas Krajeski serves as the State Department Bureau of
Counterterrorism Senior Advisor for Partner Engagement on
Syria Foreign Fighters. The Department of the Treasury’s Office
of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence leads efforts to disrupt
IS finances. Major General Michael Nagata, Commander, Spe-
cial Operations Command—Central, is leading the new congres-
sionally authorized program to train and equip vetted members
of Syria’s opposition and other vetted Syrians (Hodge, 2015:15).
The implementation of Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (AUMF). In September 2014, U.S. officials reportedly
warned the Syrian government of penetrating strikes on Syrian
territory, without any permission with the Asad regime. U.S
launched 6.288 air strikes in Iraq, and 3.104 in Syria until Janu-
ary 2016 as seen in figure 3.
The implementation of global coalition. The coalition have
implemented measures disrupting IS financing policy, disrupt-
ing revenue streams, restricting access to the financial system,
financial sanctions, and restricting flows of foreign fighters. The
goal of implementing such strategies was only to eradicate ISIS.
The ISIS has 20,000 fighters from 90 countries with more than
3,400 fighters who are Westerners still exist (The Global Coali-
tion to Counter ISIL U.S. Department of  State., Http://
www.state.gov/s/seci/, 2015:23-25).
U.S. and coalition forces have used combat aircraft, armed
unmanned aerial vehicles, and sea launched cruise missiles to
conduct more than 3,700 strikes in Iraq since August 8, 2014,
and in Syria since September 22, 2014 (The Global Coalition to
Counter ISIL U.S. Department of  State., Http://www.state.gov/
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So far they have launched airstrikes against ISIS amounting
to USD 2,275 in Syria and USD 3,198 in Iraq, Russia USD 2,716,
FIGURE 3. AIR STRIKES ON ISIS:
Source: Battle for Iraq and Syria in maps, January 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle- east-27838034.
FIGURE 4. AIR STRIKES BY STATES:
Source: Battle for Iraq and Syria in maps, January 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle- east-27838034.
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and U.S allies USD 1,574 until October 31, 2015 (Brumfield,
2015:1, retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/02/
europe/isis-britain-germany-vote-iraq-syria/.). The ISIS controlled
areas and the airstrikes of U.S. and its allies at the end of year
2015 is shown in figure 4.
In the counterterrorism implementation U.S. has supported
by U.N. Security Council Resolutions to strengthen international
sanctions and halt the flows of foreign fighters and financing to
the Islamic State, such as Resolution 2170 “to take national mea-
sures to suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters and bring
them to justice in accordance with applicable international law,
foreign terrorist fighters of, ISIS, ANF and all other individuals,
groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al Qaida,”.
Resolution 2178 (September 2014) requires Member States, con-
sistent with international law, to prevent the “recruiting, orga-
nizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a
State other than their States of residence or nationality for the
purpose of the perpetration, planning of, or participation in ter-
rorist acts” (The Global Coalition to Counter ISIL U.S. Depart-
ment of  State., Http://www.state.gov/s/seci/, 2015:25).
To get the U.S. attacks on ISIS, they run the “Train and Equip”
Assistance operation. As of June 2015, the Iraqi Security Forces
reported that approximately there are 3,100 U.S. military per-
sonnel deployed to the Iraq Theater of operations to advise and
train Iraqi forces, gather intelligence on the Islamic State, and
secure U.S. personnel and facilities. U.S. has deployed 1,500
advisers and trainers for the training of 12 Iraqi brigades (nine
Iraqi Security Force [ISF] brigades and three Kurdish peshmerga
brigades—a total of about 25,000 personnel) (Hodge, 2015:16-
17). For this arrangement, the Congress authorized and provided
$1.6 billion in funding for the U.S. training efforts in Iraq and
$715 million in U.S. funding for the Iraq training program
(Hodge, 2015:17-18).
On February 2, 2015, the Obama Administration released its
preliminary FY2016 budget requests for foreign operations and
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defense. The Administration is seeking funding to continue the
current lines of effort in response to the Islamic State threat, as
well as to respond to the challenges posed by the broader con-
flicts and regional displacements related to Syria and Iraq.
In the case of war, U.S. didn’t intend to make “war business”
with Foreign Military Sales and Arms Transfers programme. In
conjunction with expanded training efforts, the United States
also has undertaken new efforts to equip existing Iraqi forces.
Since the Islamic State-led capture of Mosul in June 2014, the
United States has proposed sales of over 5,000 additional
HELLFIRE air-to-surface missiles to Baghdad and has delivered
“the equivalent of roughly 5-6 brigades’ worth of individual sol-
dier weapons and equipment” (Hodge, 2015:18-19).
U.S. also runs the U.S. Training and Equipment for Vetted
Syrians. Several hundred U.S. military training personnel and a
similar number of support personnel have deployed in support
of a program authorized by Congress in 2014 to train and equip
vetted Syrians to fight the Islamic State and promote a negoti-
ated solution to Syria’s civil war. According to Administration
officials, the program intends to field a force of 5,400 vetted
Syrians a year for each of three-years (Hodge, 2015:22). In early
2015, U.S. officials began engaging with different Syrian groups
with more than 2,000 planned participants and vetted 400 of
them (Hodge, 2015:22). The Administration’s FY2016 Defense
appropriations request seeks $600 million in additional U.S.
funding for the program with the goal of training further 5400
personnel to add to the roughly 3000 planned to be trained us-
ing FY2015 funding (Hodge, 2015:22).
U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM AND ITS IMPACTS TOWARD ISIS
AND IN THE REGION
On March 3, General Austin described the group as “losing
this fight” and reported that anti-IS operations had killed more
than 8,500 fighters, destroyed hundreds of vehicles and heavy
weapons systems, and significantly degraded IS command and
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control capabilities. In April 2015, President Obama said, “About
a quarter of the territory fallen under ISIS (Daesh) control has
been recovered. Thousands of strikes have not only taken ISIS
fighters off the war theater, but their infrastructure has been
deteriorated and decayed (Blanchard, 2015:26). However, not-
ing that IS forces continue to show offensive capability in Iraq
and Syria, Administration officials have more recently qualified
the degree of success achieved to date and reminded the public
that U.S. plans and strategy envision a multi-year effort that is
likely to suffer setbacks (Blanchard, 2015:26).
Administration critics argue that U.S. strategy lacks effective
partners who can advance against Islamic State-held territory on
the ground and suffers from a basic contradiction in not con-
fronting the regime of President Asad of Syria (Blanchard,
2015:26).
The existence of ISIS was undeniable and undefeatable by
U.S. and its allies attacks. They still control the areas and more-
over enlarge the territory from Syria and Iraq to Libya. As their
military power ISIS has estimated that about 30 T-55 tanks, 15
T-62 model tanks, T-62 with a 115-mm tank gun along with two
secondary machine guns, 5 to 10 T-72 tanks, BRDM-2 Armored
Vehicles, MT-LB Armored Vehicles, 2 BRDM-2s, BMP-1 Infan-
try Fighting Vehicles, 20 such infantry fighting vehicles in its
arsenal, 122 mm 2S1 Gvozdika Self-Propelled Artillery, 3 2S1
Gvozdikas, Humvees, AK-47s, 82 mm B-10 Recoilless Rifle, 105
mm M40 Recoilless Rifle, 1 M40 recoilless rifle, M79 Osa Rocket
Launcher, M79 Osa rocket launcher fires a 90-mm, RBG-6 Gre-
nade Launchers, RPG-7s, grenades can reach distances of up to
920 meters, Multiple Rocket Launchers such as 57 mm UB-16,
the 107 mm Type 63, and the 122 mm BM-21, M198 Howitzer,
Type 59-1 Field Gun, D-30 Howitzer, Antiaircraft Guns, ZU-23-
2, small numbers of 14.5 mm KPV, 14.5 mm ZPU2, 23 mm ZU-
23, 37 mm Type 65, and 57 mm AZP S-60 antiaircraft guns, 23
mm ZSU-23-4 Self-Propelled Antiaircraft Guns, FIM-92 Stinger
MANPADS, SA-16 MANPADS, SA-16s, 9K32 Strela-2
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MANPADS, Antitank Missiles, The HJ-8 antitank missile, also
acquired 9M14m Malyutka-M, 9M111M Faktoriya, 9M113
Konkurs, 9K115-3 Metis-M, 9M133 Kornet, and I-RAAD anti-
tank missiles for its inventory, DShK 1938 Machine Gun, MiG
fighter jets, A MiG 21-F, and MiG-21B fighters. Also, one of the
most effective tools in ISIS’ arsenal is its social-media savviness.
The group routinely churns out slick propaganda videos. It has
an English-language outreach magazine, and it puts out tweets
hash tagged to trending events to achieve maximum exposure
(Http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/).
Almost all of the ISIS fighters have experiences the war in
Iraq and Syria during the recent conflicts. Actually ISIS has faced
the siege of U.S. and its allies (65 states), Russia and its allies
(Iran, Hizbullah, Israel), Kurdistan, and rebel groups as supported
by U.S. and its allies. ISIS position under siege is shown in figure
5 below.
FIGURE 5. ISIS UNDER SIEGE AND ATTACKS.
The U.S. strategies couldn’t defeat ISIS with its 3-year attacks
and this group has enlarged its territory. When U.S. and its al-
lies have claimed that they killed and bring down the ISIS power
by their attacks, the fact is that the ISIS’s territory was extended
to Iraq, Syria, and also Libya. The existence of ISIS was not only
in Syria and Iraq, ISIS is already present in Libya since 2015 as
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shown in figure 6 below.
FIGURE 6. PRESENCE MAP OF ISIS IN 2015.
  
Source:http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=Syria+Isis+Map+September+2015&FORM=IDMHDL
The presence of ISIS in Libya is feared around the region. As
ISIS makes inroads into Libya, officials in Rome are panicking
about an Islamic State just across the sea—but have no idea how
to combat the crisis. Last weekend in Italy, as the threat of ISIS
in Libya hit Rome with a new video addressed to “the nation
signed with the blood of the cross” and the warning “we are
south of Rome,” Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi closed the
Italian embassy in Tripoli and raised his fist with the threat of
impending military action (Http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/
18/world/isis-libya/index.html).
Whether the time is right or not, there is no question that
there is a palpable tension in Italy over the ISIS threat—Libya is
just 109 miles away from the island of Lampedusa and 300 miles
from Sicily—made worse by a 64 percent increase in illegal mi-
grant arrivals by sea since last year. In 2014, more than 170,000
people arrived from Libya and Turkey, the highest number ever
recorded. Last weekend, as the embassy staff made their way to
Italy on a mercantile ship, 2,164 migrants left the same Libyan
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shores en route to Sicily (Http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/18/
world/isis-libya/index.html).
The war in Syria is exceedingly complex, with multiple actors
fighting one another on the ground and foreign powers support-
ing their preferred proxies. Iran and Hezbollah are backing Bashar
al Assad’s regime, which is also now receiving increased assis-
tance from Russia. The Islamic State (often referred to by the
acronyms ISIS and ISIL) retains control over a significant amount
of Syrian territory. Despite some setbacks at the hands of the
U.S.-led air coalition and Kurdish ground forces earlier this year
in northern Syria, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s organization has not
suffered anything close to a knockout blow by far. Sunni jihadists,
led by Al Nusrah Front and its closest allies, are opposed to both
the Islamic State and the Assad regime (Joscelyn, 2015:1).
The situation is similar across the Syrian side of the border.
Iran has buttressed Assad’s regime with IRGC commanders and
Hezbollah fighters, who are not going to drive Sunni jihadists
out of their current strongholds and then provide stable gover-
nance in the vacuum left behind. It was Assad, we should not
forget, who originally turned the peaceful protests against his
regime into a violent conflict that has now cost more than 200,000
lives. Assad’s use of barrel bombs and chemical weapons against
Sunni areas are not a path to peace. Instead, Assad’s actions have
only continued to radicalize the Sunnis who are important as a
long-term roadblock against the Islamic State, Al Nusrah Front,
and other Sunni jihadists (Joscelyn, 2015:1).
Many have noticed that the Assad regime does not often fight
the Islamic State. It is wrong to say the two never clash, however,
as they have throughout this year. The Sunni jihadists in this
camp are opposed to both Assad and the Islamic State, but that
should not make them a partner in any American-led strategy
(Joscelyn, 2015:1).
Soon after seizing Mosul, ISIS posted photographs of its fight-
ers demolishing barriers marking the dividing line between Syria
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and Iraq. They were ‘smashing the Sykes–Picot border’ in an
attempt to rally wider Arab support for their movement by claim-
ing that they were overturning a historic injustice (Dodge, 2014:7).
Baghdad’s failure to repel the advancement of ISIS is best
understood by examining the ways in which the first instance, by
the collapse of the Iraqi military (Dodge, 2014:11). In order to
neutralise the threat from ISIS, stabilise Iraq and create a sus-
tainable future for the country, Iraq prime Minister Abadi will
not only have to reform the state but persuade the elite to change
(Dodge, 2014:17).
The region is really unsure and worsens after U.S attacks. Their
attacks didn’t gain any success among its targets. The war en-
larged not only between U.S and its allies against ISIS, but also
other movements with ISIS and has extended among civilian
population whom trained by U.S. and its allies. In the case of
Iraq, it has U.S. and its allies together with Russia, Iran,
Hezbollah, Israel in defeating ISIS, but in the case of Syria, they
are in opposite position. Russia and its allies supported Basar
regime and U.S. and its allies supported opposition groups to
Basar regime. Syrian and Iraq government didn’t go for better
condition and their lack of capacity to lead the country, caused
the decrease of weapons which eventually weakened their au-
thorities. On the other hand ISIS controlled the resources and
execute their objectives.
In summer 2014, the world’s largest and richest terrorist group,
known best through its acronyms of ISIS or ISIL, took over about
40% of Iraq’s territory, including several oil fields and agricul-
ture lands. Oil has been the primary commodity that allowed for
these dynamics (Wahab, 2015:271). See figure 7.
According to the UN, the conflict that started October 31,
2014 caused so many lives as 18,802 Iraqis were killed, 36,245
were wounded, and 3.2 million were displaced (http://
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/iraq-isis-
civilian-deaths/424668/). The figures are “staggering”. The
United Nations says that almost 19,000 civilians have been killed
201
JOURNAL OF
GOVERNMENT &
POLITICS
and more than 36,000 wounded in Iraq since the start of 2014
(http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/iraq-violence-reports-
staggering-civilian-toll-160119124911533.html.).
The news came as the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
announced that the death toll from the four-year civil war topped
76,000 in the last year alone. An estimated 17,790 were civilians,
including 3,501 children, making it the deadliest war of the year
(Pleasance, 2015:1).
The conflicts have produced millions of refugees—12 million
have fled the country or are internally displaced in Syria, plus
nearly 4 million have fled the country or are internally displaced
in Iraq. Those who have fled abroad cannot return while the
fighting continues and cannot be absorbed by their neighbors
(Jenkins, 2015:1). See figure 8.The conflicts went deep and wide
in scale. The increasing number of victims, human suffering and
starving, the damages in every field and the rising up the refugee’s
problems are perplexing. The worst conditions did not only hap-
pen in Syria, Iraq and Libya but the conflicts also spread to many
countries specially in Europe. These countries are in dilemma:
FIGURE 7. RESOURCHES OCCUPIED BY ISIS.
Source:(http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/iraq-violence-reports-staggering- civilian-toll-
160119124911533.html).
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on the one hand, they intend to give the asylum to the refugees,
but on the other hand they are scared that by doing so, they are
exporting ISIS’s ideologies and it is a more serious problem that
economic crisis.
The contemporary conflicts need global intervention and
awareness because U.S. strategies failed to solve the problem.
The U.S. used other methods such as supporting oppositions
group against Basar regime and Iraq Army and Kurds to defeat
ISIS. In fact this strategy was divided into social relations and
serenity. In the case where ISIS has too much civilian victims, it
is expected that the civilian will have their revenge. On the other
hand the ISIS has been stronger with wider occupied territory.
U.S. didn’t defeat ISIS directly nor decrease its losses and it
seems that the U.S. was not serious in implementing the strate-
gies. Moreover, they nourish the ideas of terrorism with its imple-
mentation of “training and arm programme”. Also because of
FIGURE 8. REFUGEES PROBLEMS.
Source: Battle for Iraq and Syria in maps, January 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034.
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the business among weapons, the U.S. is able to maintain the
conflicts as their new “game of terrorism”. The data showed that
the weapons deal partly with Iraq government.
The US State Department has approved a possible Foreign
Military Sale of F-16 weapons, munitions, equipment, and logis-
tics support to Iraq in estimated cost is $1.950 billion. (Source:
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, http://www.iraq-
businessnews.com/2016/01/22/us-approves-1-95bn-iraq-weap-
ons-deal/.). The data above excludes the programme of person-
nel trainings and weapons maintenance.
The game will continue further because of the on-going war
and wide involvement of groups including civilian armies. The
war also will rise the tensions in the regions with military di-
lemma. Then the terrorism will grow and “the business” will
continue, but the impact will spread which will invite the next
crisis such as refugees and its consequences.
The most important thing that the U.S. and its allies have
neglected is the tension and hatred between Moslem people and
U.S. The main ideas of U.S. war projects always carry out deeper
conflicts and hatred. The conflicts came from the actors behind
the gun, and then they come with their peace missions, sell arms
and programmes, and watch its objects in deep conflicts.
CONCLUSION
U.S. counterterrorism policy includes the following: First,
series of actions intended to “degrade, and ultimately destroy”
the Islamic State organization. Second, the U.S. lead in forming
coalition with 65 members states to defeat ISIS through a com-
prehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy. Third, U.S.
and its coalition used military forces and amount of measures
including trained Iraq army and Kurdi army, Sunni army groups
and Syrian opposition group.
The implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy includes:
First, degrading the ability of ISIS U.S. and disrupting IS Financ-
ing Policy, disrupting revenue streams base by using the U.N.
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Security Council Resolution 2178, 2199 and 2178. Second, glo-
bal coalition of anti-ISIS has implemented the Five Lines of Ef-
forts to degrade and defeat ISIS with NATO. Third, they de-
ployed 6,288 attacks in Iraq and 3,104 attacks in Syria until 20
January 2016. Also Russia had 2,716 attacks against ISIS until 31
October 2015.
Moreover, the coalition has instigated several amounts of ef-
forts including: First, “Train and Equip” Assistance, an opera-
tion for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Peshmerga and
provided $1.6 billion FY2015, and $715 million FY2016. Sec-
ond, the U.S. took the chance to sell military equipment to Iraq
nearly $3 billion 2015.  Third, the U.S. also supported the Train-
ing and Equipment for 5,400 Vetted Syrians.
In congressional testimony described that U.S. and its allies
had killed more than 8,500 fighters, destroyed hundreds of weap-
ons systems, and taken over the territory controlled by ISIS. Ac-
tually, the existence of ISIS was not impossible to defeat until
2016 U.S. attacks. Now ISIS has entered Libya.
The region’s condition can be described as:
First, the conflicts spreading to become civil war has invited
civilian army groups such as Al Nusrah Front, Kurdish army,
Hezbollah fighters, and other Sunni jihadists. The war enlarged
not only between U.S and its allies with ISIS, but with other
movements with ISIS and also it spread among civilian peoples
whom trained by U.S. and its allies. Second, the regions were
really unsure and situations may worsen politically and economi-
cally after U.S attacks. Their attacks didn’t gain any success among
its targets but the victims were thousands of civilian peoples. As
reported by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights that the
death of civil war topped 76,000. Third, the conflicts have pro-
duced more than 12 million Syrian refugee and nearly 4 million
have fled from Iraq.
IMPLICATION
The research showed that U.S. counterterrorism lack success.
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U.S. built the large coalition with huge budgets but ISIS still
exists actively. Actually, the existence of ISIS was not easily de-
feated until 2016. They controlled the areas and moreover en-
large the territory from Syria and Iraq to Libya in 2015. The
presence of ISIS in Libya is feared around the region. As ISIS
made inroads into Rome. However U.S. and its allies preferred
using “other hands” such as ISF, Peshmerga, Arab Sunni, Oppo-
sitions Armies, and moderate civilian armies to defeat ISIS. The
strategies were questioned whether the U.S. counterterrorism
has accomplished the mission consistently or they just provoked
the larger conflicts between states and also among moslems
peoples.
The worst conditions not only happen in Syria, Iraq and Libya
but the conflict has spread to many countries specially among
European countries. These countries are in dilemma. They in-
tend to give asylum to the refugees, on the other hand they are
very much concern that by doing so they are exporting ideolo-
gies of ISIS which is worse than economic crisis. The ISIS crisis
was questioned obviously. How can the group such as ISIS can’t
be destroyed in 3 years given the U.S. attacks with the support of
global coalition? Considering that the U.S. had defeated Afghani-
stan, Iraq, and Libya in the previous years and set up new gov-
ernments in each these countries. Whether this war is part of
ISIS and U.S.’s game and its allies with strategies to maintain
the regions and their interests on the moslems is the next big
question for research.
Theoretically counterterrorism needs to be revised base on
the principle of friendship approach different from nowadays as
the principle of interests. Practically U.S. counterterrorism used
other hands to defeat ISIS such as Iraq forces army, Peshmerga,
and other allies groups which resulted into large and complex
conflict. It seems that the attacks of U.S. and its allies should
also be on the ground and not only air strikes. More importantly,
the U.S. and its allies have to prove that they are defeating terror-
ism instead of making new enemy and war as their interests.
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